Colombia in the Mirror: 25 Years later, between an Incomplete Reinvention and the Risk of Repeat
Introduction: The Past Did Not Return, but It Never Left
At the end of the twentieth century, Colombia stood on the brink of institutional collapse. Today, 25 years later, the country is not experiencing the same crisis, but it does face renewed structural insecurity—more fragmented, less ideological, and deeply intertwined with organized crime and drug trafficking. Comparing these two moments is not an exercise in nostalgia, but a strategic necessity: only by understanding what changed, what was corrected, and what was allowed to erode can responsible decisions be made in the present.
Recent history shows that political and electoral decisions do matter in security. In 1998, Colombia chose reform in order to survive. In 2026, it once again stands before a decision that will shape its security trajectory for a generation.
The Late 20th Century: On the Brink of Collapse (1994–1998)
Between 1994 and 1998, Colombia experienced a perfect storm. The Proceso 8.000 scandal fractured presidential legitimacy, isolated the country internationally, and severely weakened relations with the United States. This was compounded by a deep economic crisis: unemployment at 16 percent, inflation at 17 percent, interest rates exceeding 50 percent, and defense budget cuts approaching USD 1.5 billion. Illegal armed groups exployed this political and fiscal vacuum
By 1998:
- The FARC had approximately 11,100 combatants.
- The AUC numbered around 13,000 fighters.
- The ELN had roughly 2,600 members.
In total, more than 26,000 armed men were concentrated in relatively cohesive structures with centralized command and the ability to conduct large-scale conventional military operations.
Between 1996 and 1998, the FARC shifted from guerrilla warfare to battalion-level attacks. Engagements such as Las Delicias, El Billar, and Miraflores exposed the Armed Forces’ vulnerability. More than 200 soldiers were killed and dozens kidnapped in just two years, as drug trafficking financed this expansion. By the mid-1990s, Colombia produced more than 70 percent of the world’s cocaine, and coca was the economic fuel of both insurgency and paramilitarism. The state was not only losing territory but also its influence. It was losing initiative, morale, and credibility.
Reinvention: Military Reform and Recovery (1999–2018)
The crisis forced a profound transformation. From the late 1990s through the following two decades, Colombia undertook a comprehensive reform of its Armed Forces and National Police, including new doctrine, professionalization, air mobility, integrated intelligence, operational leadership, and a sustained, long-term strategy.
The results were evident:
- A drastic reduction in guerrilla manpower.
- Recovery of territorial control.
- Strategic blows to insurgent leadership.
- Demobilization of the AUC.
- Signing of the FARC Peace Agreement in 2016.
By 2018, Colombia had shifted from a besieged state to an international benchmark in counterinsurgency and counternarcotics. It was not a country at peace, but it had state capacity.
2025–2026: Fragmented Insecurity in the 21st Century
Today, the problem is different, but no less serious.
According to the FIP report, by the end of 2025, Organized Armed Groups totaled 27,121 members, a figure comparable to 1998, but with a key difference: instead of three large structures, the threat now comes from multiple fragmented, hybrid, and adaptive organizations.
In just one year (2024–2025):
- These groups recruited more than 5,000 new members.
- Overall growth reached 23.5 percent.
- The Clan del Golfo expanded its ranks by 30 percent, nearly 2,300 additional fighters.
- FARC dissident factions grew between 22 and 25 percent, depending on the group.
Coca remains the financial backbone. Colombia closed 2025 with historic records in illicit crops and potential cocaine production. Although seizures exceeded 860 tons, they have not weakened illegal economies. Coca now finances not only rural conflict, but also urban extortion, social control, contract killings, and territorial expansion.
From Conventional War to Diffuse Violence
Unlike the 1990s, today’s groups avoid large-scale direct confrontations. Their logic is different:
- Social and territorial control, not seizure of state power.
- Selective violence, not mass violence.
- Diversified criminal economies, not coca alone.
- Low-cost, high-impact technology: in 2025, authorities recorded 277 attacks conducted with explosive-laden drones —more than double those of 2024.
Armed disputes reached their highest level in a decade:
- 13 regions are under armed dispute, nearly double the number in 2022.
- 34 percent increase in armed clashes.
- 85 percent growth in forced displacement.
- More than one million people are affected by confinement.
This is not total war, but it is persistent, corrosive, and cumulative insecurity—one that erodes state presence from the ground up.
What Must Be Reformed Today in the Armed Forces?
The historical comparison leaves a clear lesson: military reform is not an event, but a process. The Armed Forces that worked in 2008 are not necessarily the ones required in 2026.
Today, Colombia must:
- Strengthen intelligence and anticipation, not only reaction.
- Adapt doctrine and capabilities to small, mobile, technologically enabled groups.
- Integrate rural and urban security into a single strategy.
- Target critical nodes of illegal economies, not merely seize drugs.
- Recover territorial control through sustained state presence, not episodic operations.
- Protect institutional legitimacy and civil–military relations.
Without a clear strategic vision, the risk is not a return to 1998, but becoming trapped in slow, steady deterioration.
The May 30 Elections: A Strategic Decision, Not an Ideological One
In the 1990s, Colombia paid a high price for weakening its security through political calculation, improvisation, and loss of legitimacy. The crisis forced timely reform. Today, history does not repeat itself—but it rhymes dangerously.
The presidential elections of May 30 will not merely define a government program. They will determine:
- Whether security once again becomes a state policy.
- Whether past lessons are applied or deterioration is normalized.
- Whether Colombia consolidates past gains or returns to improvisation.
Experience shows that security is neither improvised nor negotiated with indulgence. It is planned, executed, and sustained. Colombia has already walked this path once. The question is whether it will have the clarity and leadership to avoid having to walk it again, starting from the abyss.
