Narcoterrorism in Latin America: The Intersection of Politics, Organized Crime, and Regional Security Threats

Narcoterrorism has deep roots in Latin America. In 1983, Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde Terry introduced the term to describe Shining Path’s attacks on counter-narcotics officials.

In Colombia, the term gained traction in the late 1990s when it was incorporated into military doctrine and became one of the foundations of Plan Colombia (2000). Authorities defined narcoterrorism as a hybrid threat embodied by the FARC and ELN guerrillas and paramilitary groups. These groups used drug trafficking to finance armed operations, expand terrorist capabilities, and challenge the state through territorial control.

Initially, the definition of narcoterrorism was debated. Academics questioned whether it accurately described a real phenomenon or merely served the interests of politics and the media. They argued the term justified extraordinary security measures and greater military involvement in drug policy. However, subsequent events in the region demonstrated the practical relevance of the term, shifting focus from theory to lived reality.

The Impact of 9/11 and the Globalization of the Term

The September 11, 2001, attacks marked a turning point. In its aftermath, the U.S. government broadened the scope of the ‘war on terrorism’ and authorized increased support for Colombia in combating armed groups financed by drug trafficking. In this way, a regional term became embedded in the global security and counterterrorism narrative.

After two decades of debate, practice has prevailed. Many states now believe that only a full deployment of state military, judicial, and intelligence resources can confront cartels and criminal organizations using terrorist tactics to expand their power. Countries such as Ecuador and Mexico adopted this approach to address crime-related violence with political and social impact.

In the United States, President Donald Trump’s administration designated several cartels and criminal groups as foreign terrorist organizations. These included the Sinaloa Cartel, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), the Northeast Cartel, the New Michoacán Family, the Gulf Cartel, and Carteles Unidos. Authorities also targeted transnational organizations such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Tren de Aragua, and, more recently, Los Choneros and Los Lobos from Ecuador. It would not be surprising if, soon, this list grew to include Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho.

All of these groups share common traits: a significant capacity for regional destabilization, territorial and political control, and firepower that exceeds that of many police forces. Their financing model is largely sustained by drug trafficking. This blend of organized crime and political violence confirms that narcoterrorism remains an active and expanding challenge. It transcends national borders and demands comprehensive responses that integrate security, intelligence, justice, and international cooperation.

Narcoterrorism as a Diversified Criminal Economy

Progressive-oriented governments have tended to address drug trafficking primarily as a social problem. However, this approach is insufficient, as it overlooks the fact that drug trafficking is one of the principal sources of financing for organized crime. The terrorist actions associated with these groups are not incidental, but rather part of a deliberate strategy: securing territorial control through intimidation and manipulation of the population.

This model not only guarantees steady income for narcoterrorist groups, but also enables them to secure social support within the communities where they operate. They achieve this by offering immediate economic benefits to certain sectors, while simultaneously imposing a regime of terror to silence those who resist.

Reducing this phenomenon solely to a social issue ignores a key factor: